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EUTHANASIA: NONE DARE CALL IT MURDER
JOSEPH SANDERS
On August 9, 1967, Robert Waskin, a twenty-
three year old college student, killed his mother
by shooting her in the head three times. Warned
by the police that he did not have to make a
statement, Waskin allegedly said, "It's obvious,
I killed her." He was arrested and charged with
murder.' Waskin's act, however, was a special
type-a type that has troubled and perplexed both
laymen and legal theorists. The homicide was a
"mercy kiling."
Waskin's mother was suffering from terminal
leukemia. The doctors in the Chicago hospital
where she was killed said that she had, at the most,
a very few days to live. She wanted to die and
had begged her son to kill her. Only three days
before, she had tried to commit suicide by taking
an overdose of sleeping pills. According to her
husband and the doctors, she was suffering deep
pain at the time she was shot. 2
In all American jurisdictions motive is no de-
fense to a murder charge. If it is shown that the
act was done with intent and premeditation, the
motive for the crime is irrelevant.3 Motive can be
taken into account by the judge in setting the
sentence, but, for Waskin, even the utmost leni-
ency on a murder conviction would have resulted
in a sentence of fourteen years in prison with no
possibility of probation. 4
On January 24, 1969, however, after a seventeen
month delay, a jury deliberated for only 40 min-
utes and found Waskin not guilty by reason of
insanity. They further found that he was no
longer insane, and he was released.' Although it
seems doubtful that Waskin was ever legally
insane, the verdict, as we shall see, was entirely
predictable.
The word euthanasia is generally used to describe
a killing that is prompted by some humanitarian
motive. Euthanasia, however, may vary with the
I Chicago Tribune, Aug. 9, 1967, at 1, col. 8.
2 Chicago Tribune, Aug. 10, 1967, at 1 col. 2.
3 State v. Ehlers, 98 N. J. L. 236, 119 Atl. 15 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1922); People v. Kirby, 2 Park Crim. Rep.
28, 31 (1823).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 §89-3; Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38
§117-1 (1967).
1 Chicago Tribune, Jan. 25, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
nature of the act, the status of the actor and the
victim, and the presence or absence of consent.
The act itself may be one of commission or one of
omission. The former, which is the concern of this
paper, is at the present time some degree of crimi-
nal homicideA
There are three reasonably identifiable groups
against, or for whom euthanasia may be com-
mittedY The first group consists of persons with
6 There has never been a prosecution of a person for
an act of omission with or without consent causing the
death of any person falling within one of the groups
subject to euthanasia. This fact, however, should not be
interpreted as evidence of the infrequency of such acts.
There is some evidence that these omissions make up
the great majority of euthanasia cases in the United
States. In a survey of 250 Chicago internists and sur-
geons by Levisohn, 156 responded to a questionnaire
asking: "'In your opinion do physicians actually
practice euthanasia in instances of incurable adult
sufferers?' Sixty-one percent agreed that physicians
actually practiced it, if not in the affirmative at least in
the negative or in terms of the omission to use every
known medical measure to sustain life." Levisohn,
Voluntary Mercy Deaths, 8 J. FoR. MED. 57, 68 (1961).
Of the same 156 physicians, however, 72% said the
practice should not be legalized.
Although this was not a random sample, still 38%
or 95 of the Chicago physicians polled admitted know-
ing of acts of euthanasia, at least by omission. This
survey refers only to acts against persons with incurable
diseases. Similar results, however, might be expected in
cases of old people dying of general deterioration. In
both these cases the patient is usually near death and
the physician inquires of the family if they wish him to
use all possible means or permit the individual to "die
in peace".
Williams has proposed a statute confirming the
legality of acts of omission in relation to dying patients
that would be useful in clarifying the law in this area.
"For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that
it shall be lawful for a physician whose patient is
seriously ill-. .. to refrain from taking steps to prolong
the patient's life by medical means;-unless ... the
omission was not made, in good faith for the purpose
of saving the patient from severe pain in an illness
believed to be of a incurable and fatal character."
G. W=Amxz s, THm SAzuCcrrr Or Lm'x AND = CRnn-
NAL LAW 345 (1957). (Hereinafter referred to as Wr.-
LIAMS.)
While acts of mercy showing just as honorable a
motive may be present in other murders against dif-
ferent groups, it appears unlikely that these crimes will
be labeled mercy killings. Thus, for example, if one
kills his child because he can not feed him, while he
may have had the best of motives-to prevent starva-
tion-this will be considered murder. See Common-
wealth v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78 N.E.2d 6-14 (1948).
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painful and terminal diseases such as cancer who,
by definition, have at best a month or two, per-
haps only a few days, to live. A second group
consists of defective or degenerate persons, in-
cluding the mentally ill, the retarded, those with
gross physical defects, and old people suffering
from senility. Some of these may be persons who
have been rendered permanently unconscious by
disease or accident and are being kept alive through
artificial medical means. The third group is com-
posed of infants and young children who suffer
from gross mental or physical defects. The life
expectancy of children in this group may be short,
or perhaps even the same as normal infants.
Euthanasia may be performed upon the request
of, or without the request of the victim. All those
in group three and the insane in group two are
incapable of consent. The consent issue, then,
usually concerns persons in group one who suffer
from painful terminal illnesses.
For purposes of legal analysis, persons com-
mitting euthanasia may be divided into two groups:
physicians and all others.8 It has been suggested
that under certain circumstances physicians should
be allowed to perform euthanasia legally.
VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA PERFORMED
BY PHYSICIANS
It appears that neither consent of the victim,
not the extremity of his suffering, or the imminence
of his death are presently defenses to homicide. 9
Demands have arisen from time to time to enact
a statute permitting a physician to terminate the
life of a consenting patient who is suffering from
some incurable, painful and terminal illness.10
8 As in the groups subject to euthanasia, the persons
who can commit this act are limited usually to physi-
cians or a member of the decedent's family. A very
close friend might be called a mercy killer, but even
this is uncertain.
9 Turner v. State, 119 Tenn. 663, 671, 108 S.W. 1139,
1147 (1908): The defendant and his girl friend had a
suicide pact. She asked him to kill her but he was
unable to kill himself. The court affirmed his conviction
for murder. There was testimony, however, that the
defendant was drunk at the time, and both parties were
Negroes, which in Tennessee in 1907 perhaps caused the
defendant to fail to get the sympathy we might expect.
Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816): The
defendant urged the deceased to kill himself while both
were waiting on death row for their impending execu-
tion. The deceased took the advice, and the defendant
was prosecuted but acquitted for murder as an as-
sistant.10 WiLIAs, 319. Yale Kamisar has written an able
reply: See Kamisar, Some Non-religious Views Against
Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42 U. Mnm.
L. Rav. 969 (1957) thereinafter cited as Kamisar].
There are voluntary euthanasia societies in both
England and the United States which have pro-
posed legislation legalizing this type of euthanasia
in order "to permit an adult person of sound mind,
whose life is ending with much suffering, to choose
between an easy death and a hard one; and to
obtain medical aid in implementing that choice." 11
Two types of statutes have been proposed by
those who favor legalizing voluntary euthanasia.
The English Euthanasia Society proposal, typical
of one type, requires a judicial investigation to
assure the existence of the patient's consent and
to prevent abuses. It has several requirements.
The patient must be over twenty-one, of sound
mind, in a hopeless condition and earnestly desirous
of a painless death. He must make an application
requesting euthanasia. His physician must combine
this request with a written recommendation
reporting on the patient's condition, and submit
them to the court. The court then assigns a eutha-
nasia referee who visits the patient and the physi-
cian in order to make himself personally aware of
the circumstances of the case. If he agrees with the
physician and believes the patient has given
rational consent, he may then authorize the death.
The authorization would be valid only for a limited
period, and the patient may withdraw his consent
at any time. 2
The eminent English legal authority, Glanville
Williams, on the other hand, has proposed a
statute that would give wide discretion to the
physician. The proposed statute provides:
It shall be lawful for a physician, after con-
sultation with another physician, to accelerate
by any merciful means the death of a patient
who is seriously ill, unless it is proved that the
act was not done in good faith with the consent
of the patient and for the purpose of saving
him from severe pain in an illness believed to
be of an incurable and fatal character.
If a physician is prosecuted, he can plead the
statute and place the burden of proof on the state
to show that his conduct did not fall under the
act. Williams does suggest that the burden of
proving consent could be placed on the doctor if
this safeguard were deemed necessary. To protect
11 EuTANASIA SocrETY, A PLAN FOR VOLUNTARY
EUTHANASIA (2d rev. ed. 1962) hereinafter cited as
[EUTHANAsiA SocIETY].
12 Id. at 16.Is W swAts 345.
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himself if prosecuted, the physician could obtain a
written request from a patient before performing
euthanasia.
The main issue created by such proposals is
whether a person dying in pain should have the
privilege of choosing an easy death. There are
several nonreligious objections to permitting such
a choice."4 The first is that it may be very difficult
to establish satisfactorily the consent of the victim.
If consent is not given until the final stages of a
painful illness, the patient may be so wracked with
pain or so doped with pain killers that he would
be incapable of rational consent. If, on the other
hand, consent is given earlier there is the possibility
that a person will change his mind after he has
become so ill that it is difficult to be sure what his
true wishes are. Even an earlier signed document
requesting euthanasia might then be contrary to
his present intent. A dying person may change his
mind several times even in one day, depending
upon how he feels.' Assuming this to be true, it
seems difficult to devise any possible test of consent
that would be more effective than the Euthanasia
Society plan, which requires repeated rational
requests to the physician and the referee.
A criticism that even the Euthanasia Society's
proposal cannot meet, however, is that the pa-
tient's consent and the physician's decision may be
based on factors other than the patient's own best
interests and desires. The patient may request
euthanasia in order to relieve his relatives' anguish,
rather than his own pain. The physician will thus
be forced to make life and death decisions while
in the unenviable position of arbitrating between
the patient and the family who oppose their dying
relative's wishes.18 Perhaps many physicians would
be unwilling to assume such a role. The present
law does avoid such conflicts between the patient,
the physician and the family by simply prohibiting
euthanasia under any circumstances. 17
The advocates of voluntary euthanasia do not
deny the difficulty in determining the reasons for
14 The religious issues involved in euthanasia are not
discussed in this comment. Most such objections are
based on the Fifth Commandment and the belief that
our bodies and life are given by God and, therefore,
He only has the right to take them away. See N. ST.
Jol-STEvAs, THE RIGHT To LinF (1964); J. SumvAN,
Tna MoRA= or MERcY K I G (1949).
"5 Kamisar 986-87.
16 Frohnman, Vexing Problens in Forensic Medicine:
A Physican's View, 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1215, 1221(1956).
'7 Kamisar 993, quoting Wechsler, The Issues of the
Nuremberg Trial, 62 PoL. SCI. Q. 11, 16 (1947).
the patient's request. They submit, however, that
in resolving conflicts between the relatives and
the patient, the patient's wishes should govern.
If one of the patient's reasons for requesting
euthanasia is to relieve anxiety in his family, this
should not disqualify him. If, on the other hand,
it were apparent that the relatives were pushing the
sick person towards euthanasia, the doctor should
refuse to perform the act.H The referee proposed in
the Euthanasia Society statute would provide
extra protection against the possibility that the
physician and the family might conspire to murder
the patient.19
A second objection to voluntary euthanasia is
that the physician may make an incorrect diagno-
sis,'0 or that a new cure might be discovered after
the execution of the patient. This assumes that
euthanasia may be performed long before the last
stages of a fatal illness. The possibility of an in-
correct diagnosis seems very remote in cases such
as Mrs. Waskin's where death was dearly inevit-
able. But in the early stages of any illness mistaken
diagnoses are possible and, like mistakes in the use
of the death penalty, are incorrectible.
Although no one knows the precise number of
mistakes that might be made, advocates of legal-
ized euthanasia do not believe that the possibility
of error is so great that euthanasia must be com-
pletely prohibited." Williams argues-and his
critics partly concede-that the chance of incorrect
diagnosis of cancer, the illness most likely to cause
requests for euthanasia, is not very great.H It
might be, moreover, that the possibility of eutha-
nasia as an alternative would cause the physician
to take extra care in making his diagnosis, realizing
that a mistake could not be corrected. The Eutha-
nasia Society proposal does require the referee to
make his own independent investigation and
Williams' plan requires the independent judgment
of two physicians.
Similar to the fear of incorrect diagnosis is the
fear that a cure might be discovered the "morning
after." Usually, however, there is a considerable
18 EuTHANASIA SocIETY 25.
'
9 Levisohn observes that if we are going to conjure
up the gruesome possibilities of abuse by physicians,
it is also possible that they could keep their patient
alive for as long as possible, regardless of his suffering,
so that they could collect the last ounce of fees. Levi-
sohn, Voluntary Mercy Deaths, 8-9 J. FOR. MED. 57, 71(1961).
20 Kamisar 1005.




period of time between the announcement of a
new treatment and its general availability. If a
cure is first announced shortly after the execution
of a patient, is is unlikely that it would be dis-
tributed in time to save the individual. Of course,
if legalized euthanasia were extended to persons
with chronic as well as terminal illnesses, then this
problem would be much greater. Under the present
proposals, however, this remote possibility should
not be an excuse for permitting the suffering of
patients who desire euthanasia."
A third objection is that in view of modem
medical techniques of controlling pain, including
tranquilizers, analgesics, narcotics, anesthetics
and glandular operations, the humanitarian goal
of relieving suffering may be accomplished without
resort to euthanasia." On the other hand, no
adequate relief seems possible for several maladies.
The Euthanasia Society of England gives as an
example cancer of the throat, which makes any
swallowing, and even breathing, extremely difficult
and painful long before the patient is about to die.
Also, emphysema and some lung cancers may
cause shortness of breath and a constant feeling
of suffocation. Severe strokes may cause a person
to become little more than a vegetable, unable to
move, speak or see.2
5
Even if total pain relief were possible with the
use of advanced medical techniques, many people
would not be able to take advantage of them.
Narcotics, still the most widely used analgesics,
may reduce pain, but the side effects, including
vomiting, nausea and long periods of consciousness
of impending doom, may be just as undesirable.' 6
Moreover, if narcotics are used their effectiveness
tends to wear off after continued use and may
bring no relief unless the physician gives such a
massive dose that it may cause death?
A final objection, the "wedge" argument,"
questions the presumed effects legalized euthanasia
would have on society. Opponents submit that the
creation of the right to choose an easy death under
certain circumstances will weaken the psycho-
logical and moral fabric of society by reducing the
absolute value placed on human life, and that it
will eventually lead to the acceptance of the idea
2EurANAsIA SocIETY 24.




that others may have the right to choose death
for an individual under certain circumstances. 29
Although anyone may commit suicide, 0 what
seems to bother many opponents of legalized
euthanasia is not the right of the individual to
choose an easy death, but the creation of a right
of execution in another. They would perhaps be
willing to grant the patient's right to die; what
they do not wish to grant is the physician's right
to kill.3 '
But Williams and other advocates are not de-
manding that all should be forced to choose eu-
thanasia, or that old people and the insane should
be eliminated. Rather, proponents urge that
society should not forbid this option to the group
presently under consideration. They observe that
the "wedge" argument may be raised against any
new proposal; each new proposal should be weighed
on its own merits. Simply because terrible conse-
quences may be imagined is no reason, according
to Williams, to reject a reasonable proposal.12 Re-
plying to the observation of critics that the present
demand for euthanasia is not sufficient to justify
the risk of later expansion, Williams argues that
if such a choice were possible and someone were
permitted to perform the act, the number of
persons requesting euthanasia would increase. He
submits that their wishes overcome any inherent
need of society to prohibit this practice because
of some fear of future consequences.
Opponents of voluntary euthanasia believe,
nevertheless, that there is no way to draft a statute
to meet all four of their objections. Williams'
proposal fails to provide what they consider to be
the necessary safeguards against irrational or
non-existing consent and mistaken diagnosis.
9 See generally Koessler, Euthanasia in the Hadamar
Sanatorium and International Law, 43 J. Cmw. L. C. &
P. S. 735 (1953); Wechsler, The Issues of the Nuremberg
Trial, 62 POL. Scr. Q. 11 (1947).
30 The whole area of suicide and assisting in suicide
is beyond the scope of this comment. Suicide and
attempted suicide are not crimes in the great majority
of American jurisdictions. An assistor in or instigator
of a suicide is usually punishable as an accessory orprincipal in murder, even in some states where suicide
itself is not a crime. Texas courts have refused this
fiction and said that assistance is not a crime. Sanders v.
State 54 Tex. Crim. 101, 112 S.W. 68, 22 L.R.A. 243(N.S.) (Crim. App. 1908). Other states have special
statutory provisions for the crime. 41 VEmaoN's ANN.
Mo. STAT. 559.080, makes an assistor guilty of man-





Williams argues that if his type of statute is
unacceptable for failure to protect against possible
abuse, those opposing it should not argue that
the safeguards incorporated at their demand,
such as exist in the Euthanasia Society proposals,
are so oppressive that they too are unacceptable. 3
If we concede that some type of safeguard is
required, the Euthanasia Society proposal indi-
cates that the State should undertake to establish
administrative bodies and have them make the
final disposition in each case. This method would
surely cause delays. More importantly, it conjures
up visions, implyed in the "wedge" argument, of
a society where the State would choose life and
death. The Nazi experience is too fresh in many
minds to permit this possibility.U
Even if it is true that neither proposal fully
meets all objections, the decision must be made
whether the privilege of easy death is so valuable
or the present system so unfair to both the phy-
sician and patient that some plan should be insti-
tuted. Assuming that the need for such a plan
does outweigh the objections, 5 Williams' pro-
posal, with a major qualification, seems superior.
The Euthanasia Society type proposal suffers
from delays at the crucial time after the patient
and physician have reached a decision, and from
its creation of a bureaucracy, which might es-
tablish for itself a vested interest in the main-
tenance and possible extension of the practice of
euthanasia.
Although Williams' proposal lacks the safe-
guards of the Euthanasia Society proposal, hope-
fully the quality of physicians insures that abuses
would be very infrequent, and with consultation
and perhaps the development of euthanasia
specialists trained in diagnostic work, mistakes
would not be common enough to justify refusing
euthanasia to those truly desiring it. Nonethless,
the physician should be required to show that he
did have the patient's consent. This could consist
of a written request. If it were proved that the
deceased did not give his consent, the physician
would be guilty of some degree of criminal homi-
23 W m uis 334.
34 Koessler supra note 29; Wechsler, supra note 29.
35 From a social science viewpoint, moral grounds
seem to preclude empirical research as to any of the
possible effects of a euthanasia statute, including mis-
takes in diagnosis and abuses of consent. The only way
we may ever be able to know the actual demands for
and effects of a statute and the willingness of physicians
to use it, is to pass one and see how it operates.
cide. In order to deal with the problem of an
incorrect diagnosis, every voluntary mercy killing
should be followed by an autopsy by another
physician or the state coroner. A mistake could
be the basis of a cause of action on behalf of the
relatives for malpractice. Perhaps an erring phy-
sician should not be permitted to perform any
other mercy killings.
One of the effects of the foregoing restrictions
would be to limit the number of mercy killings.
Such requirements may discourage the doctor from
performing euthanasia, or at least force him to
wait until he was sure of his diagnosis even though
the counter-risk would exist that by then his
patient will no longer be capable of consent.
O=R TYPES oF EUTHANASIA
Another classification would be involuntary
euthanasia committed by physicians as well as
voluntary and involuntary euthanasia performed
by others. While these acts may have the same
humanitarian under pinnings as those previously
discussed, they lack either the request and con-
sent of the victim or are performed by persons
other than a physician, who presumably cannot be
certain of the inevitable fatality of the victim's
illness. Because of these factors, no one has sug-
gested that these acts be legalized. Rather, the
discussion has been whether the penalities for such
crimes should be reduced.
Although most of the present debate about
euthanasia concerns acts of commission by phy-
sicians, causing the death of consenting victims
suffering from some incurable and painful illness,
no known cases in the United States have involved
this special type of mercy killing. A tabulation of
American cases indicates the types of acts which
have led to prosecution are one involuntary, one
by a physician, and by others three were of a
voluntary nature and seven involuntary. 6
36 a. Louis Greenfield chloroformed his imbecile
teenage son to death. The boy reportedly had the
mentality of a two year old. Greenfield said at the trial,
"I did it because I loved him, it was the will of God."
N. Y. Times, May 11, 1939, at 10, col. 2. He was ac-
quitted of first degree manslaughter. N. Y. Times, May
12, 1939, at 1, col. 5.
b. Louis Repouile read about the Greenfield case.
He said, "It made me think about doing the same thing
to my boy." N. Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1939, at 21 col. 2.
Repouile chloroformed his thirteen year old son, who
had been blind for five years, bedridden since infancy
and was also an imbecile, who never learned to talk.
N. Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1939, at 25, col. 7. Repouille was
indicted for first degree manslaughter but convicted of
19691
JOSEPH SANDERS
In any given trial for euthanasia, in contrast
to a decision involving the disposition of an or-
second degree manslaughter and freed on a suspended
sentence of five to ten years. N. Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1941,
at 44, col. 1.
c. John Noxon, a well-to-do laywer, was charged
with first degree murder for killing his six month old
mongoloid son by wrapping him in a lamp cord and
electrocuting him. Noxon claimed that the boy's death
was an accident. N. Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1943, at 27, col.
2; N. Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1943, at 23, col. 7; N. Y.
Times, Oct. 29, 1943, at 21, col. 7. Noxon was convicted
of first degree murder. N. Y. Times, July 7, 1944, at
30, col. 2. His death sentence was commuted to life.
N. Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1948, at 13, col. 5. Later his
sentence was further reduced to six years to life to make
parole possible. N. Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1948, at 5, col. 6.
He was paroled shortly thereafter. N. Y. Times, Jan.
4, 1949, at 16, col. 3. The Massachusetts Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's decision and denied Noxon's
request for a new trial, based on technical grounds, in
Commonwealth v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N.E.2d
814 (1946).
d. Harry Johnson asphyxiated his cancer stricken
wife. N. Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1938, at 1 col. 3. After a
psychiatrist said he believed Johnson to have been
"temporarily insane" the grand jury refused to indict
him. N. Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1938, at 30, col. 4; N. Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1938, at 46, col. 1.
e. Eugene Braunsdorf took his 29 year old daughter,
a "spastic incapable of speech", out of a sanitorium,
and shot and killed her because he feared for her future
should he die. He then attempted suicide by shooting
himself in the chest twice. He was found not guilty by
reason of ioisanity. N. Y. Times, May 23, 1950, at 25,
col. 4.
f. Dr. Herman Sander was acquitted of the murder
of his cancer stricken patient. N. Y. Times, Mar. 10,
1950, at 1, col. 4. Dr. Sander, for some unknown reason,
had written on his patient's chart that he had given
her ten c.c. of air intravenously four times and she died
within ten minutes. N. Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1950, at 1,
col. 1. At the trial, however, his defense was that the
patient was already dead at the time of the injections.
N. Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1950, at 1, col. 1. The patient
apparently did not request death. The case turned on
the causation question and did not live up to its billing
as a case to decide the legality of euthanasia.
g. Miss Carol Ann Paget, a college girl, was indicted
for second degree murder (carrying a mandatory life
sentence) for killing her father while he was still under
anesthetic following an exploratory operation which
showed him to have cancer of the stomach. The girl
apparently had a cancer phobia and was acquitted on
grounds of "temporary insanity". N. Y. Times, Feb. 8,
1950, at 1, col. 2.
h. Harold Mohr killed his blind, cancer stricken
brother and on a conviction of voluntary manslaughter
with recommendation for mercy he was sentenced to
three to six years and a $500 fine. N. Y. Times, Apr. 11,
1950, at 20, col. 5. He pleaded insanity and there was
testimony tending to show that his brother had re-
peatedly requested to die. Some of the testimony,
however, tended to show that Mohr was drinking at the
time and two other brothers testified against him. N. Y.
Times, Apr. 4, 1950, at 60, col. 4; N. Y. Times, Apr. 8,
1950, at 26, col. 1.
i. People v. Wemer. The transcript of this case is
presented in Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 178, 184-87 (1966). The defendant, 69,
dinary murderer, the jury and judge need not
consider aspects of rehabilitation, retribution or
protection of society from dangerous behaviorY
The jury may still feel, however, that at least
involuntary euthanasia is not a practice that
should go completely unpunished, and by inference
condoned, lest it become more common.w In
order, therefore, to show general opposition to this
behavior and to dissuade others from a similar
practice, the jury might prefer to stigmatize the
actor and perhaps give him some minimal punish-
ment.39 If forced to an election between conviction
for murder and an acquittal or finding of insanity,
however, the jury will usually acquit, not wishing,
perhaps with good cause, 40 to rely upon an execu-
tive pardon to mitigate the sentence.
pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the suffocation of
his hopelessly crippled, bedridden wife. The court
found him guilty, but then after hearing testimony of
the defendant's children and others showing what great
devotion the defendant had shown towards his wife
and that the murder had been at her request, the court
allowed the guilty plea to be withdrawn and a plea of
not guilty entered. Held: not guilty. For a criticism of
this obviously unorthodox procedure see 34 N. D. LAW.
460 (1959). It is interesting to compare the events in
the Werner case with article 37 of the URUGUAYAN
PENAL. CoDE: "The judges are authorized to forego
punishment of a person whose previous life has been
honorable where he commits a homicide motivated by
compassion, induced by repeated requests of the
victim." Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative
Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. Rxv. 350, 369 (1954).j. Mrs. Wilhelmia Langevin, 56, shot her 35 year
old son, an epileptic, with a deer rifle. She was indicted
for first degree murder. N. Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1965, at
26, col. 6.
k. Robert Waskin. (The facts of this case are pre-
sented on page one of this article.)
The table below shows the various punishments in-
flicted on the persons above.
Punishments
First Lesser Acquittal by Refusal
Degree Degree Reason of Acquittal to
M rder Homiidde Insanity (3) Indict(1) (2) (3) (1)
Noxon Mohr Paget Sander Johnson
-4 Repouille Brauns- Green-
years dorf field
Waskin Werner
8 See E. SumLAND & D. CEss.Y, Pm.cU'rPLEs
op CmunmoLoG 286-92 (1960).
38 Repouille, supra note 36b.
89 Support for this belief is found in the use of the
doctrine of diminished responsibility now existing in
England. See note 51 infra.
40 For a review of the political intrigue involved in the
Noxon case following his conviction see Newsweek,
Jan. 17, 1949, reprinted in INBAu & SowLE, CAsEs
AN ComENrs ON C-aRugAL JusTicE 128 (1964).
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The only middle ground available in American
jurisdictions at the present time is to convict the
defendant of a lesser offense, which by its definition
rarely fits the facts of the case.4 This can be ac-
complished by indictment for a lesser offense or for
several levels of homicide at once.4 It may be
possible to indict for murder alone and then
instruct and empower the jury to bring back a
conviction for a lesser offense if it so desires, but
this may not be permissible when the facts of a
case cannot conceivably support the concept of a
crime of passion or an involuntary act.4
There are at least three objectionable features
to the present system. First, the consequence of
applying what amounts to inapplicable and
inadequate rules of law to these cases is that the
results range from refusal to indict to findings of
first degree murder, generally in the absence of
any facts that might justify such wide variations.
Secondly, since there is no conceptual legal niche
for the handling of mercy killings, we are presently
required to use legal fictions in dealing with the
problem. Such fictions generally are undesirable
since they tend to make the law appear hypocritical
in the eyes of the public. Finally, the present sys-
tem invites the possibility that in some future
case an overly severe punishment may be inflicted.
Several alternatives to the existing state of affairs
are available.
4Repouille's murder of his son was not involuntary,
supra note 36b. Mohr's act was not an act of passion
in the legal sense, supra note 36h. In relation to this
point, Judge Learned Hand said in a later case to deter-
mine whether, considering the murder, Repouille had
possessed "good moral character" for five years pre-
ceding his petition necessary to qualify for citizenship:
"Although it was inescapably murder in the first degree,
not only did they [the jury] bring in a verdict that was
flatly in the face of the facts and utterly absurd-for
manslaughter in the second degree presupposes that the
killing has not been deliberate--but they coupled even
that with a recommendation which showed that in
substance they wished to exculpate the offender."
Repoulle's petition for citizenship was denied, but
Judge Hand virtually invited him to file a new one as
soon as five years had elapsed from the date of his
conviction. Repouile v. United States, 165 F.2d 152,
153 (2d Cir. 1947).42Apparently the best procedure to follow at the
present time is to indict for several degrees of homicide,
thus assuring that the jury will have a choice.
" See 41 C.J.S. Homicide §389-b (1944). Some prose-
cutors may say it is their duty to prosecute solely for
the offense committed. Such a stance in effect forces
the jury to do all the dirty work. The prosecutor has a
duty to see that justice is done as well as to see that the
law is upheld. In such a morally confused area as mercykilling, to stand back and shake one's head at the presentstate of the American Law is at best a cowardiy point
of view.
One altemative is to use motive as a substantive
criterion in deciding what offense has been com-
mitted. In American jurisdictions, motive is at
best an evidentiary factor in prosecuting a case
and an administrative tool in setting the punish-
ment after it is determined by other means what
offense was committed.
In some criminal codes of civil law countries,
motive is a substantive element of the offense of
homicide. Both the German and Swiss criminal
codes provide for a finding of manslaughter,
rather than murder, for homicides where the
offender does not show either a reprehensible
attitude or dangerous and inhumane behavior.
This, of course, applies to almost all mercy killers."
The jury uses motive in deciding to convict for a
lesser offense In those countries, however, the
use of motive avoids the conceptual and factual
problems' that are caused in the United States
where this element theoretically should play no
part in determining the actual offense committed.
While the use of motive as a substantive element is
conceptually appealing, it does not seem that
euthanasia cases are so frequent or their disposition
so unjust that they would justify what amounts
to a massive overhaul in our conceptualization of
the elements of homicide.
In Norway motive is not used to determine the
actual offense committed, but it may be used to
reduce the sentence imposed by statute when the
victim is hopelessly ill. 45 American jurisdictions
have always used motive in determining the
sentence, but this is not a statutory requirement,
and the practice is handicapped in the case of
capital offenses by the existence of high minimum
sentences and the impossibility of probation.
Uruguay is the only nation that actually offers
the possibility of immunity to the mercy killer.45
Norway and several other European countries
44These statutes and all other information about
Civil Law techniques in dealing with euthanasia, are
taken from an excellent article by Helen Silving,
Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law,
103 U. PA. L. REv. 350, 378, 380 (1950) [Hereinafter
cited as Silving].
45 Silving 368. "Punishment according to sections
288 and 289 ... shall not be applied where the action
was committed with consent of the victim. Where a
person was killed ... with his own consent, or where an
actor motivated by mercy takes the life of a hopelessly
ill person, or assists in such acts of killing, the punish-
ment maybe reduced below the minimum set by statute
and a milder form of penalty may be imposed." Non-
WEGIA PENAL CoD-x §235.
46 Werner, supra note 36i.
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have special provisions for homicide by request.4
In all of these states the penalties attached are
less if a request can be shown. The purpose of the
request is irrelevent so long as the actor responds
to it out of altruistic motives. Since both of these
defenses-homicide by request and reduction in
sentence for motive-are applicable in Norway,
a case such as Waskins' might lead to a dramatic
reduction in sentence.
Another possibility is presented by the enact-
ment of a diminished responsibility statute such
as is now employed in England.45 The statute
lessens the offense and punishment for persons
who suffer from some mental abnormality which
is not sufficient to permit them to use the insanity
defense. This, in fact may have been the situation
with some of the defendants in the American
cases.49 The statute has, however, been used for
euthanasia cases in general, regardless of mental
abnormality. 50 When applied to mercy killings,
it reaches the same result as the law in Germany
and Switzerland. However, while it is conceptually
more in tune with the general elements of homi-
cide already so well entrenched in the common
law, its use does require one to indulge to some
extent in the same type of legal fiction that is
presently condemned.
One further alternative would be to do away
with minimum punishments in all degrees of
homicide. A person could be convicted of first
degree murder and still be given a minimum sen-
tence or be put on probation. This proposal seems
superior to a specific statute for mercy killers,
since this is a very hard crime to define, and any
codification would probably lead to constant
disputes over whether a certain case fits within
the statute.
Although this is the easiest change and con-
ceptually the least drastic, it also would have the
effect of permitting anyone to receive a very
short sentence, a result that might greatly con-
found those who believe murderers should be
47 Silving 378, 386.
Is Homicide Act of 1957, 5&6 Eliz. 2, c. 11.
49 Paget, supra note 36g.
10 Arthur Gray, 44, killed his son who had cancer of
the spine, by giving him sleeping tablets. He pleaded
guilty to manslaughter on grounds of diminished
responsibility as the statute permits. The sentence was
two year's probation. N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1965, at 1,
col. 4. G. WLLIAIMs, CRIMINA. LAW, THE GENERAL
PART, 558 n. 24 (1961), reports on three other cases
where diminished responsibility has been used in this
manner.
imprisoned for many years. 51 Another objection
to this proposal might be that it would increase
the possibilities for corruption, or that "soft
judges" would return many truly dangerous crim-
inals to the streets. The general movement to-
wards more liberal sentencing power in other
areas, however, has not proven especially corro-
sive.
It might be said that this proposal would weaken
the legal supports indicating the high level of
social condemnation with which the public views
homicide. It is doubtful, however, whether this is
the purpose of a minimum sentence;5 2 that func-
tion, if it exists, would seem to be performed
adequately by the maximum sentence. Nor is it
likely that the absence of a minimum sentence
would lessen the deterrent effect of the law, if
indeed any punishment so uncertain and delayed
as imprisonment acts as a deterrent in the indi-
vidual case.
If this plan is too drastic, perhaps a much lower
minimum-one or two years-could be established.
The one homicide where abuse through corruption
might be most likely, and the defendant the most
dangerous to society-murder for profit-could be
made a special offense with a higher minimum
sentence.
An examination of all of these alternatives,
however, makes it questionable whether there
should be any change at this time. Using motive
as a substantive element is clearly too drastic a
conceptual step and the use of diminished re-
sponsibility is only a fiction of a lesser degree.
Finally, while a reduced minimum sentence for all
homicides may be desirable, the proposition should
be decided on its own merits, and the more rational
handling of mercy killers would be only one rather
small consideration.
The present system, as fictitious as it sometimes
is, has not yet worked a great injustice on anyone
committing euthanasia. Our system of trial by
jury permits justice to be done without causing
any tear in the conceptual fabric of the law; and
although there is no available method of providing
a minimum punishment for mercy killers, perhaps
the anxiety and discomfort of going through a
1 Other than protecting society, already discussed,
the reason for a minimum sentence seems to be retribu-
tion, a purpose that is widely discredited as an objec-
tive of the criminal law.




criminal trial is both a sufficient deterrent to others
and an adequate display of public censure.
CONCLUSION
While the problems of euthanasia are legally
intriguing and morally perplexing, legislative solu-
tions seem to be far in the future. There is strong,
organized opposition to voluntary euthanasia
statutes from religious leaders and others, and
from the law itself with respect to changes in the
status of the involuntary mercy killer. The medi-
cal profession generally seems willing to permit
the status quo to remain, partly perhaps because
it permits a great deal of discretion with little
fear of prosecution and partly perhaps because
physicians do not wish to accept the extra burdens
a statute might impose on them. On the other hand,
there is little organized support for change in any
of the areas. The people who would be most di-
rectly affected by change-dying persons-are in
no position to argue for their preference.
As this comment has noted, there are valid
reasons for opposing the legalization of voluntary
euthanasia by physicians and perhaps little need
for change in the other areas. As individuals live
longer, however, and thus are more likely to con-
tract painful and malignant diseases, and as
medical discoveries make it possible to keep
persons alive longer, the problems may magnify,
and a more extended discussion will then be neces-
sary. What individuals on both sides of the argu-
ment should keep in mind is that it is not they,
at least at the present, who have to bear the conse-
quences of their decisions. To quote Glanville
Williams:
The toad beneath the harrow knows
Exactly where each toothpoint goes.
The butterfly upon the road
Preaches contentment to that toad.
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